Reviewed by Brian Morron
by John Ellison (Manifesto Press: 2023)
Following on from his alternative history of 1918, Censorship Overruled, John Ellison has written a fascinating account of the Second World War, from an avowedly socialist perspective, as one would expect from an occasional contributor to the Morning Star.
For a book of fewer than 200 pages, the sweep is impressive, from the mid-1930s to the aftermath of the war in 1946. While he spends a good deal of time in Britain, he reminds us why this was called a world war, encompassing the rest of Europe, Russia, the USA and the Far East, with a particular focus on India. It is full of insightful extracts from contemporaneous accounts: diaries, memoirs and newspaper reports, which bring a liveliness to the narrative. His many hours in the British Library were well spent. The book is also attractively produced, with generous illustrations.
So, why the title? My understanding of the term ‘a people’s war’ in relation to World War Two, is that, unlike World War One, the civilian population was targeted – on both sides. First, there was the Blitz. Later there was the carpet bombing of Berlin and, of course, Dresden. Ultimately, there was the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan, to which we will return. People - civilians - were in the front line. It sometimes seems that in the 21st century all wars are, in that sense, people’s wars, whether in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine or Gaza. John Ellison, however, uses the term to ask a specific question: what was the motivation of Britain, France and America in going to war? Was it to protect the people from the scourge of fascism? Or was it to protect their own various imperialist possessions? In the case of Britain, there is no doubt that Winston Churchill sought to preserve Britain’s empire, not least India.
Some of the answers can be found in John’s account of the buildup to war. Most of us have some understanding of the politics of appeasement; but I was intrigued to read that there was an Anglo German naval treaty in June 1935 which overrode the Treaty of Versailles and allowed a significant increase in Germany’s naval fleet – including the building of submarines. In the mid-1930s the predominant view of the political establishment in this country and in America was that Soviet Russia was a greater threat than fascist Germany. Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister until he was succeeded by Neville Chamberlain in 1937, was determined to keep out of any war with Germany. In 1936, he is quoted as saying ‘if there is any fighting in Europe to be done I should like to see the Bolshies and the Nazis doing it’. US vice president, Harry S. Truman, is said to have commented, ‘if we see Germany winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and in that way let them kill as many as possible’. Those hopes were realised in June 1941 when Hitler invaded Russia leading to the loss of millions of lives, military and civilian. John makes a strong case that this loss of life could have been curtailed if the Allies had opened a second front in the West, for which Stalin had pressed but which Churchill, in particular, opposed. The general view of the military and the politicians was that the USSR would soon be overwhelmed. This underestimated the resilience of the Red Army and the Russian people. Russia managed to repel the German invasion but at huge cost and loss of life.
Initially, of course, Russia and Germany had signed a non-aggression pact in August 1939 which proved to be the springboard for Hitler’s invasion of Poland a matter of days later. What is less well known is that Stalin invaded Poland from the East the following week. It is salutary to note that the USSR rationalised its invasion of Poland on the ground of its ‘concern’ for ethnic Ukraine and Belarus. It seems that these issues never go away.
One section of the book which makes for particularly uncomfortable reading is that dealing with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 3 days apart, in 1945. It is generally assumed that the Japanese would otherwise have continued to fight and that thousands of Allied soldiers’ lives were saved by forcing the Japanese to surrender. In a persuasive few pages, John quotes a number of sources which coherently suggest that the Japanese were seriously considering surrender – albeit that ‘unconditional’ surrender was still being rejected – and that the US authorities were well aware of this. The Swedish ambassador was a conduit for talks, Sweden having been neutral in the war. John therefore posits the view that the US were keen to see their new weapon used in practice and to assess its consequences; and that this, at least as much as wishing to bring the war to a speedy end, was the reason for the decision to drop not one but two atomic bombs on predominantly civilian targets. Some SBL members might remember Max Hastings discussing this very topic when he came to visit.
So much for a People’s War. This is a stimulating read on a subject of enduring interest.
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